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CASE COMMENTS
TRADEMARK LAW: THE NEWEST ODD COUPLE IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PRODUCT DESIGN MEETS
SECONDARY MEANING
Wal-Mart Stores v. SamaraBros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000)
Jeffiey W. Abraham*""
Petitioner, a nation-wide retailer, produced a line of clothing based on
Respondent's designs and sold the imitation garments at a substantial
profit.' Respondent filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, alleging product design trade dress
infringement.2 The district court found the overall design of Respondent's
garments to be inherently distinctive and entitled to protection.3 Petitioner

* For my parents, Dr. William and Kay Abraham.
** EditorsNote: This Case Commentreceived the George W. Milam award forthe best Case

Comment written during Spring 2001.
1. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 207-08 (2000). Petitioner
contracted with one of its suppliers to manufacture the line of children's clothing. Id. That
manufacturer copied sixteen of respondent's garments in creating the new designs. Id
2. Id. at 208. Respondent claimed infringement of an unregistered trade dress under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act, which provides:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,
services, or commercial activities by another person.., shall be liable in
a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is likely to be
damaged by such act.
Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2001). To establish a cause of action
for trade dress infringement under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must prove that its trade
dress is either inherently distinctive or has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning.
Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., I I1 F.3d 993, 999 (2d Cir. 1997). Recent case
law shows that product design is an accepted form of protectable trade dress. See, e.g., Ashley
Furniture Indus., Inc. v. SangiacomoN.A., 187 F.3d 363,366 (4th Cir. 1999) (regarding bedroom
furniture); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., 71 F.3d 996,999 (2dCir. 1995) (regarding sweaters);
Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780,782 (8th Cir. 1995) (regarding notebooks).
3. Samara Bros., Inc. v. Judy-Philippine, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 895, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). In
determining whether trade dress is inherently distinctive, the major question is whether consumers
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moved for ajudgment as a matter of law, asserting that Respondent's trade
dress alone was incapable of identifying Respondent as the source of the
goods and therefore was not entitled to protection without a showing of
secondary meaning.' In denying Petitioner's motion, the district court held
that the jury had sufficient evidence to support its conclusion that
Respondent's product designs possessed source-identifying
characteristics. 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the denial of Petitioner's motion, finding Respondent's product
designs to be inherently distinctive.' The United States Supreme Court
reversed and HELD, that product design can never be inherently
distinctive, and therefore can only be protected upon a showing of
secondary meaning.7
One of the principal struggles in the area of intellectual property is the
balance between fostering competition and protecting inventors' rights.'
Statutory protection of trademarks was established to help consumers
recognize the owner of goods and services, thereby securing for an owner
the goodwill of his business.9 The Lanham Act promotes this end by
preventing the manufacture of imitation products which would confuse

understand the design to be an indicator of the product's source. Id.; see also Abercrombie & Fitch
Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1976) (defining inherently distinctive marks
as those whose intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source).
4. SamaraBros., 969 F. Supp. at 897. Wal-Mart argued that Samara's trade dress was not
inherently distinctive because it was amorphous and contained non-distinctive features that cannot
independently identify source. Id
5. Id. at 898. The evidence included (1) Samara's efforts, over a span of many years, to
produce garments that have a similar "look" and a consistent feel to them, in order to build brand
loyalty and establish a customer base, (2) the consistent use of designs, (3) advertising efforts, (4)
Wal-Mart's efforts to plagiarize, and (5) the garments themselves. Id
6. See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 208.
7. Id. at216.
8. See Willajeanne F. McLean, The Birth, Death, and Renaissance of the Doctrine of
Secondary Meaningin the Making,42 AM. U. L. REV. 737, 739 (1993).
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is two fold. One is to protect the
public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular
trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and
wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time,
and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his
investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.
S. REP. No. 79-1333, (1946), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274.
9. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1994). "National protection
oftrademarks is desirable... because trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality
by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation." Id (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar
Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985)).
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consumers trying to distinguish the owners of competing products.10 Such
restrictions could potentially establish statutorily created monopolies, and
thus, courts have assumed a familiar role in defining the protective
boundaries of legislative creations."
InAbercrombie & Fitch Co. v. HuntingWorld, Inc., 2 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit attempted to regulate
overprotection of word marks by adopting a classification scheme to
determine the extent of protection a word mark would be afforded."3 In
Abercrombie,a well-known sporting goods store sold products bearing the
registered trademark "Safari."' 4 Charged with infringement ofthe "Safari"
mark, the defendant sought a cancellation of the mark on the basis that it
was a common word."5
In determining the level of protection a word mark was afforded, the
court considered the source-identifying quality of the word. 6 The court
held that fanciful, 17 arbitrary, 8 and suggestive 9 terms were inherently
capable of source identification and were thus protected immediately upon
use.20 Descriptive words2 ' alone, the court noted, were not independently
10. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2001) (protecting registered trademarks); 15 U.S.C. §
1125 (2001) (protecting unregistered trademarks).
11. See, e.g., Park'NFly, 469 U.S. at 191 (refusing to allow an infringing producer challenge
an incontestible trademark on the basis that it is a descriptive word); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats,
599 F.2d 341, 348-54 (9th Cir. 1979) (providing an extensive list of factors to consider when
testing for likelihood ofconfusion among consumers); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc.,
267 F.2d 358, 360 (2d Cir. 1959) (restricting the owner of a federally registered trademark from
enjoining ajunior user in a separate geographic area from using a similar mark until the senior user
is poised to enter that geographic market area, thereby increasingthe likelihood of confusion among
consumers).
12. 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
13. Id. at9-11.
14. Id. at 7.
15. Id.
16. Id. at8.
17. Fanciful words are words that are created solely for use as atrademark. Id at 11 n.12. An
example ofa fanciful trademark is KODAK film. A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores,
Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 221 (3d Cir. 2000).
18. Arbitrary words are common words used in an unfamiliar way. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d
at 11. An example of an arbitrary trademark is IVORY SOAP. Id. at 9 n.6.
19. Suggestive words require "imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as
to the nature of [the] goods." Id at 11 (quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc.,
295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)). For example, ORANGE CRUSH, as applied to a
beverage, is suggestive. See Orange Crush Co. v. Cal. Crushed Fruit Co., 297 F. 892, 893 (D.C. Cir.
1924).
20. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11. The unusual nature ofthe word "Safari" in connection with
the good was sufficient to remove it from the public domain in that particular context. Id
21. Descriptive words convey an "immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or
characteristics of the goods." Id. at 11 (quoting Stix Prods., 295 F. Supp. at 488). Geographic
locations, such as "Camden Yards," may constitute descriptive word marks. See Md. Stadium Auth.
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capable of identifying the source of goods and were thus not afforded
immediate protection under Lanham Act section 2(e).' The Abercrombie
court, however, acknowledged section 2(f)2 3 of the Lanham Act, which
provides that "nothing [herein] shall prevent the registration ofa mark used
by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in
commerce."24 The court adopted this language as statutory support for the
protection of descriptive marks upon a showing of secondary meaning.25
The court found that secondary meaning exists when consumers have come
to associate the descriptive
mark with the source of the product rather than
26
the product itself.
While the classification scheme used by the Abercrombie court was
generally accepted with respect to word marks,27 its applicability to other
28
forms of marks was challenged in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,Inc.
The Two Pesos Court confronted the issue of whether the interior design
features of a restaurant could be protected as an unregistered, inherently
distinctive trade dress without additional proof of secondary meaning.29 In
Two Pesos, respondent opened a fast-food Mexican restaurant chain in
Texas and sought trade dress protection in the overall theme of the
restaurants, including interior and exterior decorations, as well as the
"festive and vivid color schemes."3 Subsequently, petitioner opened a fastfood Mexican restaurant in Texas with a motif that was very similar to
respondent's.31 The two restaurant chains managed to co-exist peacefully
until respondent expanded its business into areas of the state previously
v. Becker, 806 F. Supp. 1236, 1239 (D. Md. 1992).
22. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10. As section 1052 of the United States Code states:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the
goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account
of its nature unless it ... consists of a mark which. .. when used on or in
connection with the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively
misdescriptive of them ....
15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2001).
23. 15 U.S.C. 1052(2)(f) (2001).
24. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2)(f)).
25. Id. at 9.
26. Id. at8.
27. Eg., Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (concerning
infringement over use ofthe service mark PARK'N'FLY); Thompson Med. Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753
F.2d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 1985) (using Abercrombie classifications to characterize the unregistered
word mark SPORTSGEL as a descriptive mark).
28. 505 U.S. 763, 764-65 (1992).

29. Id.
30. Id. at 765 (quoting Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th
Cir. 1991)).

31. Id.
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occupied by petitioner.32 Petitioner filed suit for infringement under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act.33
The Two Pesos Court recognized section 43(a) of the Lanham Act as
authority for protecting unregistered trademarks. 34 According to the Court,
the unregistered marks protected by the statute were subject to the same
limitations imposed on marks which qualified for registration under section
2 of the Act.35 Additionally, the Court held that the Lanham Act protected
36
the "total image and overall appearance" of a restaurant as trade dress.
The synthesis of these two statutory interpretations allowed the Court to
conclude that any trade dress inherently capable of source identification
should be protected without a showing of secondary meaning.37
In determining whether a particular trade dress was inherently
distinctive, the Two Pesos Court found the Abercrombieclassifications of
word marks equally applicable to trade dress.38 The Court justified its
holding by noting the lack of any textual basis in the Lanham Act for
treating verbal trademarks differently than trade dress.3 9 The Court also
emphasized the anti-competitive effects of adding a requirement of
secondary meaning for inherently distinctive trade dress, stating that it
"would allow a competitor.., to appropriate the originator's dress.., and
to deter the originator from... expanding and competing." '

32. See id.
33. Id.
is common ground that § 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered
34. Id. at 768. "[I]t
trademarks." Id; see also A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 296 (3d Cir. 1986)
(relying on "the principle that unlicensed use of a designation serving the function of a registered
mark constitutes a false designation of origin and a false description or representation").
35. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768 ("[Tihe general principles qualifying a mark for registration
under § 2 of the Lanham Act are for the most part applicable in determining whether an
unregistered mark is entitled to protection under § 43(a).").
36. Id. at 764 n.l. "'Trade dress' involves the total image of a product and may include
features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales
techniques." John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (1lth Cir. 1983)
(affording trademark protection for check stub forms).
37. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 776.
38. See id.at 768-69; see also Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659
F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that trade dress should be protected according to the same
principles governing trademarks, requiring ashowing of secondary meaning only when the claimed
mark or dress is not inherently capable of source identification).
39. Two Pesos,505 U.S. at 773-74.
40. Id at 775. "[P]rotecting an inherently distinctive trade dress from its inception may be
critical to new entrants to the market and ...withholding protection until secondary meaning has
been established would be contrary to the goals of the Lanham Act." Id. Such goals include
"secur[ing for an] owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and protect[ing] the ability of
consumers to distinguish among competing producers." Id. at 774 (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v.
Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985), citing S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3-5 (1946),
reprintedin 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275).
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Some marks, such as color in QualitexCo. v. JacobsonProducts Co.,4
will always require a showing of secondary meaning, because such marks
can never independently identify a product's source.42 In Qualitex,
petitioner manufactured dry-cleaning pads of a specific color.43
Respondents began to manufacture similarly colored dry-cleaning pads,
which prompted petitioner to register its color as a trademark and file a suit
for infringement." The Qualitex Court reversed a lower court ruling and
held that color alone could be protected as a trademark upon a showing of
secondary meaning."5
The Court found that colors fell within the statutory definition of
trademarks through a broad interpretation of the language.46 The Court
acknowledged, however, that color could never automatically function as
a source identifier.47 Similar to descriptive word marks, colors, the Court
found, should not be entitled to protection on their own.48 The Court
reasoned that over time consumers could come to recognize a product's
color as signifying a brand.49 This delayed consumer association of a
product with its source was sufficient to entitle colors to trademark
protection.5"
The instant Court found product design to be analogous to color,
making secondary meaning a mandatory prerequisite for all product
designs in order to qualify for statutory protection." According to the
instant Court, nothing in the statute demands that every category of mark
necessarily include marks capable of being inherently distinctive.52 The
instant Court reasoned that the predominant function of inherently
distinctive marks is source identification,53 and that consumers are
predisposed to regard those marks as identifying the source of a product.54

41. 514 U.S. 159 (1995).

42. Id. at 162-63.
43. Id. at 161.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 162.
46. Id Section 45 of the Lanham Act states that trademarks include "any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). "Since human beings
might use as a symbol or device almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this
language... is not restrictive." Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162.
47. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162-63.
48. Id at 163.
49. Id An "imaginary word.., on ajar of orange jam immediately would signal" the source
of the brand, but the orange color would not. Id. "But, over time, customers may come to treat a
particular color on a product or its packaging... as signifying a brand." IdL
50. Id
51. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000).
52. Id at 211; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2001).
53. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 212.
54. Id. Such signals automatically tell a customer they refer to a brand, and "immediately...
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After finding that consumers normally interpret product design to render
a product more useful or appealing,55 the instant Court concluded that
consumers generally do not equate product design with the source of a
product. 6
Accordingly, the instant Court stated that since product design lacks the
inherent ability to identify the source of a product, over-protecting product
design would be harmful to consumer interests.57 The instant Court sought
to avoid the anti-competitive consequences that might follow from
restricting the utilitarian and aesthetic purposes ordinarily served by
product design." One such effect was a reduced number of competitors
willing to enter new markets due to the increased threat of a lawsuit for
infringing uses of such utilitarian features.59
The instant Court acknowledged that a clear test to determine inherently
distinctive product design would enhance the predictability of such
lawsuits, thereby regulating any anti-competitive effects.6 ° However, the
instant Court showed little confidence that such a test could or would be
successfully developed." Even if such a test were developed, the instant
Court reasoned that the plausible threat of a lawsuit alone would still have
drastic anti-competitive effects.62 Overall, the instant Court determined that
the negative effects on competition in requiring secondary meaning for
protection of product design were manageable when compared with the
burdens of adopting an inherently distinctive test for product design,
especially when the chance of an owner's product design being inherently
distinctive was so minimal.63

signal a brand or a product source." Id (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162-64) (internal quotation

marks omitted).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id. The utilitarian and aesthetic purposes described by the Court are independent of
any functional aspects of product design, which will never be protected, even with a showing of
secondary meaning. Id at 214.
59. Id. at213.

60. See id
61. Id. at 213-14. Onesuggestion was to userelevant portions ofthe analogoustest developed
for product packaging in Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd, 568 F.2d 1342, 1344
(C.C.P.A. 1977). That test included such factors as whether the packaging was a common shape or
design, whether it was unique or unusual in a particular field, and whether it was a refinement of
a well-known form of ornamentation for a particular class of goods viewed by the public as such.
Id. The instant Court, however, had little faith in the fact that such a test would provide the basis
for summary disposition of an anti-competitive strike suit. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 214.
62. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 214.
63. See id This is especially so since the owner can turn to patent and copyright law for
design protection. Id.
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The instant Court recognized the apparent conflict its holding created
with its earlier decision in Two Pesos,where the Court held that trade dress
could be inherently distinctive." The Court reconciled the two cases by
clarifying that Two Pesos established that product packaging could be
inherently distinctive, not product design.65 The instant Court was aware
that this distinction would force courts to face the difficult task of
classifying trade dress as either product design or product packaging.'
Nevertheless, the instant Court reasoned that this would be an easier task
than deciding whether or not a product's design is inherently distinctive.67
The instant Court's refusal to establish a test for inherently distinctive
product design enhanced the importance of distinguishing between pro duct
design and product packaging. The instant Court, however, failed to
articulate a test to guide lower courts in this endeavor.68 Until a valid test
is developed, courts may mistakenly characterize product design as product
packaging.69 On the surface such a misnomer appears relatively innocent,
but this error could result in courts finding that product design is inherently
distinctive, effectively impeding the instant Court's efforts to avoid the
anti-competitive consequences of over-protecting such trademarks.7 °
The Two Pesos holding, establishing that the test for inherently
distinctive product packaging is the classification scheme identified in
Abercrombie,7 further complicates the problem. The combination of the
Two Pesos and Wal-Mart holdings could lead to product design,
improperly labeled as product packaging, being tested for inherent
distinctiveness using the Abercrombie classifications. In effect, the instant
Court has indirectly established a test for inherently distinctive product

64. See id.
65. Id at215.
Two Pesos is inapposite to our holding here because the trade dress at issue...
seems to us not to constitute product design. It was either product
packaging-which as we have discussed, normally is taken by the consumer to
indicate origin--or else some tertium quid that is akin to product packaging and
has no bearing on the present case.
Id. (emphasis in original).
66. Id.
67. Id. In the case of close decisions, the Court ordered lower courts to "err on the side of
caution," towards finding product design, because requiring secondary meaning will result in the
greatest benefit for the consumer. Id.
68. See id. at 214-16.
69. See id For example, a classic glass Coca-Cola bottle may constitute packaging for those
who drink the Coke and then discard the bottle. Id. at 215. On the other hand, it may constitute the
product itself for those consumers who collect bottles. Id
70. See id
71. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. 773.
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design, a task which the Court claimed could not successfully be
accomplished.'
The instant Court did, however, direct lower courts to proceed with
caution when classifying a mark as either product design or product
packaging. 3 This dicta indirectly addresses the problem of lower courts
over-protecting product design through mistaken classification as
inherently distinctive product packaging.7 4 Such a cautious default
position, however, may produce an equally harsh result, requiring proof of
secondary meaning before protecting product packaging that is inherently
distinctive.75 This additional requirement of secondary meaning for an
inherently distinctive trade dress could prove detrimental to an inventor's
rights.76
The instant Court attempted to offset this effect by increasing consumer
protection, ensuring that consumers would not be deprived of competition
with regard to the utilitarian and aesthetic features that product design
ordinarily serves. 7 A potential problem in requiring secondary meaning,
however, is the burden it imposes on the start-up of small companies.78
Under the instant Court's construction, a producer's trade dress in a
particular market would be defenseless against competitors who
appropriate that dress, thereby stifling the desire of businesses to create
new products and enter new markets.79
The distinction between product design and product packaging trade
dress appears to be a hollow creation by the instant Court to justify an
arbitrary end. The instant Court's attempt to protect consumers by curbing
owner's rights left both parties in a uneasy position. Ultimately, the instant
Court harmed consumers by creating a monopoly where it sought to protect
them by fostering competition. Consumers, promised an abundance of
competition resulting in lower prices and an increased selection of goods,
are really faced with businesses that are unwilling to expand into new
72. See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 214-15.
73. Id. at 215.

74. See i
75. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774.

76. Id at 775.
Engrafting onto [section] 43(a) arequirementof secondary meaning for inherently
distinctive trade dress ... would undermine the purposes of the Lanham Act...
By making more difficult the identification of a producer with its product, a
secondary meaning requirement for a nondescriptive trade dress would hinder
improving or maintaining the producer's competitive position.

Id. at 774.
77. See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213.
78. Two Pesos,505 U.S. at 775.

79. See id.
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markets. Producers, recently afforded protection under the Lanham Act,
now find their inherently distinctive product packaging unprotected until
they can show secondary meaning. The only real winners are the existing
producers who have a monopoly not only over products but over entire
markets as well.
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